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A History of Ancient Philosophy: From the Beginnings to Augustine, by Karsten Friis Johansen.
Translated by Hendrik Rosenmeier. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. xii + 624 pp. + list of
abbreviations, bibliography, index. $140.00 US; $210.00 CAN.
As I read this book I found it hard to resist imagining myself sitting in Prof. Johansen’s (really
long) introductory course in ancient philosophy. It was generally a pleasant experience; he is an
engaging storyteller. His choppy writing style -- a direct result of those endless dashes -- was
irritating until I began to think of it as a speaking style. It was rather easy, then, to imagine him
reading from his notes at the front of the class, pausing at the beginning of a dash, and without at all
lifting his head looking up from his notes and scanning the class in that half inch between his
eyebrows and the top of his glasses as he explained what he meant by what he had just read, then
continuing where he had left off.
In this book Johansen has set himself the task of narrating the history of ancient philosophy from
the beginnings through Augustine, even though by most accounts Augustine belongs to the
medieval period. Given that he accomplished this in just 624 pages, his treatment is not
surprisingly basic and dogmatic. References to the secondary literature are sparse, as is discussion
of scholarly debates, both of which are good things in an introductory text. I can imagine the book
being of value to the casual reader who wanted a general overview of the philosophy of the period
without having to read the actual textual materials themselves, although I doubt that such a reader
would be willing to hand over the $140.00 US required for this general overview. It might also be
useful for the new instructor with minimal background in ancient philosophy who has been assigned
to teach it in addition to the other courses he or she was really hired for. The inclusion of
paraphilosophical cultural material helpfully illuminates, though again at an introductory level, the
interaction between what is happening in philosophy and what is happening in other areas of civil
life, e.g. science, politics, history, and the arts. But those whose academic energies are primarily
spent in ancient philosophy will probably find the book a disappointment; it is certainly not one
they would choose as a course text in place of the primary materials. I base this judgment on my
close study of Plato’s Timaeus in particular and substantial experience with Greek philosophy in
general. Since Johansen’s narrative is written at roughly the same level of sophistication throughout,
as far as I can see, it would be very surprising if others did not feel their own special fields of study
handled as roughly, superficially, sometimes even misleadingly, as I did mine. Let me illustrate.
The place of the Timaeus in the Platonic corpus is a matter of considerable importance, not least
because if it was written after the Parmenides, then at least two consequences surely seem to
follow: first, that Plato has not rejected his theory of forms after all, as it might appear he did from
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their very rough ride in the Parmenides; and second, that since Plato already realizes from his work
in the Parmenides that no moment of time can be the first one as he sets out to write the Timaeus,
the literalist reading of the dialogue is easily eliminated. Conversely, if the Timaeus was written
before the Parmenides, then the Parmenides might just be a record of the death and burial of the
forms, which would imply a fairly significant change of mind on Plato’s part, and the literalist
reading of the generation of the world would not so easily be ruled out, at least not on the grounds
of the understanding of time presented in the Parmenides. Much effort already has been expended
by others trying to determine the “correct” order of the dialogues; this effort is likely to continue. It
is in this context that Johansen simply asserts, without any discussion at all (219, 241), that the
Timaeus was written after the Parmenides. Thus his statement that there is no change in Plato’s
opinion between the Republic and the Laws (249) is evidently not a conclusion but rather a
(seriously questionable) premise.
On to details. The reader’s first encounter with the question concerning the eternity of the world in
Plato is a bald assertion from Johansen, without any comment at all, regarding what is to this day a
highly controversial question, namely that Plato’s world in the Timaeus is eternal (95). The
Demiurge, he much later says (238), is “symbolic”, the generation of the world “a story,” “a fable”
(238), basing this view on Plato’s repeated use of the word “mythos” in this dialogue. Now if this
were the only language Plato used to describe what he is doing here, it might be reasonable to infer
that the account Timaeus narrates “is expressly presented as a fantasy” (243). But Johansen simply
and completely ignores the fact that Plato about as often uses “logos” to describe what Timaeus is
doing: giving a plausible account of the generation of the universe. Obviously even mentioning this
fact would have made the thesis being repeated here less ‘clearly true’ than not mentioning it would
have, seriously misleading the first-time reader of Plato. Johansen does, it is true, later revisit the
subject, when he comes to Xenocrates (264), but there says dismissively only that “[Xenocrates]
has a strangely literal imagination.” Whatever else might be said, to call a literal interpretation of
the dialogue strange without any consideration of the arguments involved amounts to nothing more
than an ad hominem, and I was disappointed to find that Johansen somehow found it necessary to
take that step. In actual fact, the argument in favor of Johansen’s thesis concerning this aspect of
the Timaeus is not anywhere near as obvious as he makes it out to be, although it is clear he has
studied Taylor1 and Cornford2 closely, who also believe that in the Timaeus “all motion in the end
is owing to a self-moving first mover, the cosmic soul” (361) and that consequently “it is probable
that the ‘evil’ [world-] soul [in the Laws] corresponds with the necessity of the Timaeus” (252).
None of this, again, is obviously true. For those who are interested in detailed and powerful
arguments to the contrary, see T.M. Robinson’s chapter on the Timaeus in Plato’s Psychology and
many further references there.3
Regarding a sampling of the other dialogues, a few illustrations will suffice. (1) The five arguments
for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo are handled in one and one-half pages (187-88). (2)
When it comes to the Republic, one reads that “[Plato] can conceive of nothing but his good little
state in a constant state of war” (199). That is because, we soon are told, his ideal state is premised
upon luxury (202). I am repeatedly astonished to see how widespread the view is that Plato actually
endorses the project of a life spent in pursuit of material luxury. Nothing could be further from the
truth. The simple Socratic state is Plato’s ideal one, too. It’s just that the general run of humanity as
a rule doesn’t, can’t, or won’t see this, and so the second-best would be the sort of state outlined in
this dialogue, complete with army and philosopher-king. (3) The significance of the location of
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Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium is no sooner mentioned than just dropped as “another matter”
(191). As well, Eros is misleadingly described (negatively) as a demon, not (neutrally) as a daimon
or spirit. This might be a fault simply of translation. (4) Describing the Laws as “Plato’s last
message” -- an outmoded way to regard the dialogues, but clearly not yet extinct -- Johansen
asserts, without any argument at all, that “surely the Athenian is not Plato” (249), and does not
even deign to mention Diogenes Laertius’ claim to the contrary, let alone dispute it.
I do not doubt that someone else who had made a special study of Aristotle would critique
Johansen’s treatment of Aristotle similarly to my critique of his treatment of Plato. (Same for
specialists in the presocratics, the hellenists, Plotinus, even Augustine.) The general presentation is
one thing, the particulars are quite another. Space restricts me here to few comments on Aristotle,
but enough to raise important issues. (1) Regarding the Metaphysics, Johansen says that for
Aristotle “the world does not exist because god created it; god exists because the world exists”
(363). The first part is correct, of course, because Aristotle’s world is eternal. But the second part,
as it stands, is either seriously mistaken or seriously misleading. The world needs god as its object
of desire; god strictly speaking has no metaphysical need of the world. If Johansen has some special
meaning in mind, he owes the reader an explanation of it. (2) Regarding the Ethics, Johansen says
this: a “strange circular structure is attached to the moral virtues: we become just by performing
just acts” (374). I don’t see what is so strange about this. The preconditions for action in Aristotle
are rational deliberation and decision, neither of which a youngster is capable of; consequently the
youngster does not, strictly speaking, act. So how then does a youngster become just? Aristotle’s
answer seems to me quite simple: by imitating a just person. Insofar as the youngster’s actions
proceed from imitation, they can’t yet count as authentic, naturally. This is one way out of the
problem inherited by Aristotle that only the already just can do just things. The act, in other words,
is potentially just in the case of the imitator, actually just in the case of the actually just person.
Perhaps the Danish here rendered as “strange” is not connotatively negative. (3) Regarding the
Politics, Johansen correctly mentions Aristotle’s view that “the more useless, the better”(390), but
he does not convey the explanation Aristotle himself gives for this view. I cannot imagine why
Johansen would withhold such crucial information from his introductory audience.
Another irritation is that the author seems to conceive of his audience as one he expects no
intelligent response from, who really are beginners. Given this, it is surprising how often foreign
words and phrases are left untranslated by the translator, e.g. “Gebrauchwissen” (184), “expressis
verbis” (187), “hors de combat” (189), “sub specie aeternitatis” (211), “eo ipso” (219),
“Empfindung” vs. “Wahrnemung” (224), “dolce far nieute” (250), “das Wahre is das Ganze” (255),
and so on, both before and after this sample. I strongly doubt that many casual readers of ancient
philosophy, or introductory classes for that matter, at least in America, are going to understand on
their own what such words and phrases mean. It would not have been difficult for the translator to
have given English equivalents in square brackets. Some of the phrases can no doubt be looked up
in a good dictionary, although why the onus is suddenly put upon the introductory, casual reader is
beyond me; in any case, others word and phrases probably cannot be, and in cases like that the
language employed does not invite but rather repels, the last thing I would have thought Johansen
was interested in doing.
Lastly, a few items of a more philological sort. (1) The “noble lie” in the Republic, according to
Johansen, is a mistranslation for “symbolically true fable” (204). By now the reader is already used
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to getting little or no justification for important views held by the author. But how kalos can be
rendered as “symbolically true” is a mystery to me. The word means “good,” “beautiful,” even
“excellent,” but not “symbolically true.” The lie, then, says Plato, is a really good one. What this in
turn might mean is another question. But that is a question of interpretation, not of translation. I for
one have little doubt that Plato’s point is not that this lie is good because of what it is, but rather
that it is good because of what it does. Some evils, in other words, are in fact instrumentally good,
and this is one of them. This lie somehow conduces to the preservation of the state, and is to be
understood in that context. (2) Johansen renders the Greek for Aristotle’s formal cause, to ti en
einai, as “to-be-what-it-was” (355). This word-for-word translation is just wrong. The whole point
of this type of cause is to define X in terms of its completed state, what it will one day be if it is
not completed already, and so it is truer to say that an acorn is a young oak than that an oak is an
old acorn. More helpful renditions would therefore be “what X would someday be” or “what X
would turn out to be,” on the understanding, of course, that nothing interferes.
Although I have been critical of this book, I have done so from the vantage point of a specialist in
ancient philosophy. Clearly it serves a need for the less demanding, less exacting reading public. It
does do well, in other words, what it aims to do. Perhaps it would be most helpful to think of it as
a basic guide for the academic tourist who wants to know what all the fuss is about in Greek
philosophy.
David Guetter
Humboldt State University
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